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RESPONDENT'S BllEF 
STATEMENT OF 'lllE NATURE OF 'lllE CASE 
Tnia is an action for personal injuriaa 
arising from a pedestrian auto colliaion 
at the intersection of 300 \Jut and Highway 
91 in St. George, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On a jury verdict, the lower court en-
tered judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defandanta in th& amount 
of $10,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
1b.e defendants seek a reversal of the 
jud&lllent in favor of the plaintiff and a 
new trial. 
l 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Th.e Plaintiff-Respondent accepts the 
facts stated in Defendants-Appellant• 
brief as L~r a.s they ~o, but d.sirea to 
add additione.l facts thereto. 
Plaintiff-Respondent will be referred 
to herein as Plaintiff and Defendants-
Appellants as Defendants. 
Officer Hutchings testified that the 
sun wtrlle traveling east on Highway 91 
created a problem ( Tr.28). '!he defendant 
noticed the sun as he came aaat on High-
way 91; he noticed the sun on the wind-
sldeld. this happened every morning aa be 
went to school and it did not irritate 
him. His car was equipped with viaore, 
but he did not pull them down ( Tr.67). 
Defendant was well acquainted with tti. 
route as he traveled it to school many 
times that ach.ool yaar. HE KNEW 'DlE 
salOOL CROSSING SIGN WAS THERE NEAR 300 
2 
WEST INTERSEC'fiON AS HE HAD SEEN IT MANY 
TIMES (Tr. 66). 
Defendant did not see plaintiff or 
little Cannon girl in the intersection by 
th.e time he had entered the a-.e (Tr.69). 
When defendant reached tbe weat croaawalk 
of said intersection he saw a friend ou 
the side and he nodded and waved bia hand 
and when he looked back tha plaintiff and 
i.ittlt! girl wera right in front of hill 
and he hit his brakes (Tr.62). 
Defendant saw plainti£f grab the little 
gi.rl and turn her (Tr.68). 'lbe baDper hit 
, both plaintiff and little girl and they 
fell to the side (Tr. 02). Defendant did 
not see plaintiff, Mr. Eager, until be waa 
practically upon him and hit hia (Tr.69). 
As a result of said accident plain..--
tiff waa in a cast for eleven waeka and 
two days ( Tr.38). He suffered an injury 
to his hand (Tr.38) which continued to 
3 
bother him even to the time of the trial 
of the case (Tr.41). 
'!bat at the t:Une of the last ex9in-
ation of the plaintiff by Dr. Ruaach, ba-
f ore. the trial of the case, to-wit, on 
November 25th, 1964, ( Tr.10) ha complain-
ed of pain in the left ankle and left Jma&, 
also pain above his le.it eyebrow wbare he 
had suffered a large cut in said accident 
-~~-.. ~~Au.plained of headaches ( Tr.ll) and ha 
was at the time suffering fraa poat-trau-
ma tic arthritis (Tr.ll-12). Plaintiff 
C• ·uld not do what he had enjoyed before, 
like fishing, hunting and pine-nut gather-
ing, on account of injuries auatained. 
(Tr.44-45). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN STAHNG 
THE ISSUES IN INSTRUCnoN NO.l. 
Instruction No. 1 aa cam.plained of by 
counsel for defendant states the nature 
4 
of the case, the relief sought by the 
plaintiff and the position of tha defen-
dant in admitting the accident but deny-
ing pla~ntiff 's injuries and stating de-
fendant's position in alleging that the ac-
cident was soley caused or proximately 
contributed to by the plaintiff's own ne-
gligence. 
It is suhnitted that the interpreta-
tion :cead into Instruction No. l by de-
fendants counsel is strained and cartainly 
not justified in view of further inatruc-
t~ons, to-~it, Instruction No. 4 which 
reads as follows: 
"The party upon whom the burden of 
proof rests, must sustain it by a pre-
ponderance of the evidance. 'l'be law 
does not permit you to b~se a verdict 
on speculation or conjecture aa to the 
cnuse of the incident in question. If 
the evidence does not preikonderate m 
favor of the llaintiff, m inj?: the 
chat!e of ner igence then he baa £ail-
ed o lulf it his &ifden of proOf and 
your f Indlng must be agafut him on 
that issue. In otherwords, if alter 
considering all the evidence, i! ahould 
appear to you just as probable that the 
5 
defendant driver ~as not negligent, as 
that h.e was, or that his negligence, if 
any, was not a proximate cause of the 
incident as that it was such a proximate 
cause, then a case has not bean estab-
lished against the defendant driver by 
a preponderance of the evidence as the 
law requires and the defendant driver 
cannot be held liable." (r:..phaaia added). 
The above instruction, particularly 
the part emphasized clearly states where 
t"Le burden of proof i.s in the preae.nt 
matter and the duty of the jury ~ith re-
spect to considering all of the evidenc1 ~ 
to de tennine the preponderance of the 
same either for the plaintiff in hia al-
legations or defendants in their deLi~l'.'J. 
It is sulmitted that if the Court had 
included all of the pointa suggested by 
defendant in Instruction No. l it would 
have been con£using and it is further sub-
mitted that it is the Court's duty to 
fully cover all of the matters bel.ore thn. 
Court in the. instructions, which the C4urt 
did fairly and plainly. They are aum-
6 
ll&rized in Instruction No. 29 in the fol-
lo~ing words: 
POINT NO. II 
'!HE TRIAL COURT DID NOT C<J4MIT ERROR. 
IN STAnliG 'DlE IIJTIES OWED 'It> PLAIRTIFF. 
Defendants argue that the giri.ng of 
lnatru.ctiona No. 15 and. 17 in effect dir-
ected that the defendant waa negligent 
although the Cart did not rule that the 
defendant waa negligent aa a aatter of law. 
Defendant cite• Charvoz va. Cottrtll 
(1961) 12 U. 2d 25, 361 P. 2d 516 in wtU.ch 
case tie plaintiff contended that the de-
7 
ceased had the right of way in a croaa-
walk and therefore the defendant waa na-
gl igen t aa a aatter of law. The facta in 
that case ahow that the defendant waa tra-
Yaling in an autcaobile at approxiaately 
30 milaa per hour aa be approached an in-
tersection; that hia headlight• were on 
low beam, that ba did not aae the dec.-d 
until be waa about 60 to 65 feet frca the 
point of iapact. He applied Drakaa bat 
was unable to a top tba car in t:lae to a-
Yoid hitting the decaaaed. Tba plaintiff 
contended that defendant should haft ob-
aerved the deceaaed at leaat 100 feet 
from the crosswalk, tharefore the defen-
dant waa negligent in failing to keep a 
proper lookout. 
To thia point the Court atatea aa fol• 
lows: 
"'Ibis reasoning, however, overlook• 
certain other pertinent facta. It waa 
8 
dark at the time of the accident; the 
street had a blacktop aurface; the in-
tersection was only dial.y illuainated; 
the backdrop, aa aeen from defendant'• 
automobile, waa a dark vacant lot on 
the. northeaat corner of the interaec-
tion; there was a car atopped on tba 
north aide of the intersection with it' a 
lights burning; and the decedent waa 
we.aring dark clothing. Thar.fore, al-
though tba evidence ia undiaputed tb.at 
the defendant could have stopped his 
car in t:lae to avoid the accident bad 
he aen the deceased at a cliatance of 
100 feet, the ci.rcuutancea are auch aa 
to create a doubt in tba ainda of rea-
aonable men aa to defendant•• ability 
to obaer9e the decedent at that diatanca 
and hence tba iaaue of f allure to keep 
a proper lookout vaa for tba jury." 
'lhe Qilrt further holda in aaid ca• 
that: 
"Be.fore the duty of a driver to yield 
tha right of way arise• he muat be ill 
a situation whereby be ia eitb.er aware 
of the preaence of a pedestrian within 
the croaawalk or &b.ould hawa. in. the 
exercise of reasonable care, bacaae a 
ware of the pedestrian'• pre..nce in 
time to yield the right of way." 
We will agree with defendant• conten-
tion beginning second line from bott• of 
Page 13 of hi• brief and continuing on 
Page 14 as follows: 
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"that the driver of tho motor vehicle 
had the duty to yield the right of way 
to a pedestrian, but only when he is in 
a situation where he is aware of the 
presence of the pedestrian within the. 
cross-wali:, or should have been aware, 
in the exercise of ordinary care, of 
the pedestrians presence in time to 
yield the right of way." 
i~.nd it is plaintiff's contention that 
by the exercise of ordinary care plain'!- -
tiff • s presence in the cirosswalk could 
have been observed by defendant in ample 
time to have yielded tbe right of way. 
nu.a position ia baaed on the following 
reasons: 
a. 'Ihe defendant knew the location of 
the school crossing becauae he had tra-
veled the route many, many times during 
the school year. 
b. He knew and had observed the signa 
indicating the achool crossing many 
ti.m&s. 
c. After making a turn heading eaat 
along the highway towards said school 
croasing he noticed the sun on the 
windshield, he bad noticed it many 
times, but it did not irritate him. 
His car was equipped with visors but he 
did not use theta. 
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d. Whea ha approached tba iatenectt.. 
he looked to tba aide to great -
f rieada and. when he apia leoked toward 
the roadway tbe plaintUf aDd tbe little 
Cannon drl were right 1a Ida path and 
be could not atop. 
c.rtainly witb orcU.Dar7 can be oeuld 
have obserY8d the officer ia ..Uoa with 
the little girl by hie aide, bolcliq ap 
hi.a banda and tr7iAg to pt hie atma1:1oa 
to atop, and efta after ba utencl tbe ia-
terMCtioa, if he bad not -.. l•*i•& to 
the aide and peetiag friaUa, be -14 
uwa obaerwd plaiatUf aa4 little girl ill 
t!ae to ha• ~lclM tbe ri&bt .r way. 
We f11.rthar agn.e vitll •l•daat'a --
•l ·ill tda atat••t in au brief Oil .... 
19 aa follovas 
"If yoa •••nod the dafandaat drl...r 
ha4 ao ucw fer Det .·-iq or ••t 
yie.1.diag to t1ae pedeatri.a, laetnRiea 
llo. 17 certaial.1' woalcl lie p......-." 
It ia nlaitted tlaat tba pl.&iad.ff -
not naglipat ill jmping ill tbla pathwap 
of the autcaobile M a4aitted MC•M la 
ll 
his attempt to stop the defendant he had 
let go of the little Cannon girl's hand 
and he was using both of his hands to at-
tract the attention of the defendant to 
yield the right of watl and the little 
girl had stepped across the center of the 
highway and was in the :inn.ediate path of 
the automobile which was at that tiae only 
a few feet away. He did eYerthing that 
a hUllan being could do to try and aave. 
the little girl and as a result both he 
and the little girl received severe in~a. 
It is submitted that under the facts 
above shown in the eri.dence Inatructiona 
#15 and 1117 are not a mis-statement of the 
law nor are they inconsistent with eacb. 
other or with any of the other inatructiona 
given. 
POINT NO. III 
nu.: COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERR.OR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION R>. 9. 
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It is subaitted that defendanta con-
tention that the Court coaaitted three 
prejudicial errors in giving Inatruction 
No. 9 is not well taken because Ho. 9 
should be con&idered with No. 10 which ia 
as follows: 
"Even though you find in faV'Or of tba 
plaintiff, and that the defendant waa 
negligent, tbe plaintiff nevertbelaaa 
may be barred frm recoYery by contri-
butory negligence. Before contributory 
negligence would preclude plaintiff'• 
recovary, you amat find from a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that each of 
the two following propooitiou are true: 
Propoaitiou Ro. l 
That .tile plaintif£ waa negligent in 
one or more of the following particulara: 
a. '!bat the plaintiff failed to ob-
aerve the danger involv.d. 
b. Plaintiff left a place of aafety 
and moved into the path of a vahicle, 
when the vehicle waa ao cloae that 
it waa im.poaaible for the driver to 
yie.l.d the right of way. 
Propoaition Ho. 2 
'lbat said negligence of the plaintiff, 
if any, was a proximate and contribut-
13 
ing cause of the accident • If you find 
these two propositions against the 
plaintiff, he cannot recove.r, even 
though you find in favor of tha plain-
tiff and against the defendant on tbe 
issue of ne.gligence of the defendant." 
Both Instructions #9 and #10 should 
be considered with Instruction #29 which 
states specifically: 
"you are. not to single out any certain 
sentence or any individual point or in-
struction and ignore the others, but 
you are'> consider all the instructions 
as a whole and are to regard e.ach in the 
light of all the othera.u 
It is aubmitted that under Instruction 
No. 9 the jurors did find that the defen• 
dant was negligent in either or both of 
point 'a' in driving too fast for exist• 
ing conditions or, point 'b' in failing 
to keep a proper lookout for pedeatriana 
in the crosswalk. 
Defendant argues that the defendant waa 
blinded by the sun there.fore could not 
see. If such was the case then be was 
certainly driving too fast for existing 
14 
conditions at 20 or 25 miles per hour in 
a 30 mile posted zone. If the sun was a 
factor in obscuring his vision and view, 
then he ignored the same, drove along at 
the same speed '\vithuut regard to pedes-
trians in the school crossing. 
If the sun was not a factor that he 
need consider than his early morning 
greeting t:o friends that took his atten-
tion away from the road ahead was ce.rtain-
ly a failure to keep a proper lookout. 
It is submitted that the jury is not 
obligated to designate the particular 
act of negligence upon which they base a 
decision, and defendants argument that 
when they did not in the present case 
then in all probablity they fwnd negli-
ger •... ~ upon an improper ground is specious. 
POINT NO. IV 
'IDE COURT DID NO'£ CCH1IT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING ON DAMAGES. 
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First let us con.aider whether or not 
the judglaent rendered in the pruent caee 
i• exceasive. 
'1'he plaintiff, although 65 years of age 
was in good heal th prior to tba accident 
cOllplained of. He bad lived acmawbat of au 
outdoor, rugged life. He enjoyed fiahing, 
hunting and pine-nut gathering. whim piae-
nut gathering waa amewbat lucrative to 
him in the a&ASOD. thereof I aad during the 
auaaer aeaaon he worked at much mon lucra-
tive em.plo,aent than $100 .00 per month tbat 
he waa getting from the City aa a Croui.ng 
<bard. All of which ia now dallied h:Ja Oil 
account of the iajuri.6• auatained.. 
Ha atill suffered frcm the injury to 
his hand at the time of tba trial. Bia 
b.eadachea peraieted at that tiaa and hia 
poat-tram.atic arthritis in the injured 
leg prevented the outdoor acti•itiaa that 
b.e had enjoyed and profited fr.a for so 
16 
many years prior to said injuries. 
His headaches and suffering fran in-
jured hand and post-traunatic arthritis 
should not be minimized because he was 
not taking medication "pills" as defen-
dant calls them. He would rather suffer 
the pains from the injuries than the 
sickness and nausea from the medication 
which he had taken for re.lief but had to 
abandon. 
It is submitted that the award of 
$10,000.00 for the injuries sustained, 
for the suffering endured by the plain-
tiff for the eight months to the time of 
the trial, for the depriYation of activi-
ties which had helped to make hi• life 
worthwhile prior to the. injury and as-
surance that the injuries were not just 
temporary but might continue for a lon~ 
time and might even worsen. 
17 
POINT NO. 5 
EXCESSIVE DAMAGES WERE ROT AWARDED 
UNDER n!E INFLUENCE OF IMPROPER ARGUMENT 
OR FOR ANY O'DIER CAUSE. 
The suggestion that the award of 
$10 .000.00 was motivated by sane section 
of the statute which requires that much. 
liability insurance is wishful thinking 
on the part of counsel for defendant be-
cause no such suggestion waa aver aada in 
the trial of the case or in the ina truc-
tions to the jury and there waa no indi-
cation that any of the juror• knew that 
there was such a statute; Jmt it will be 
admitted that moat people today know that 
a large percentage of the owners of auto-
11obilaa carry liability iaaurance. 
It is admitted that counsel for the 
plaintiff felt a reaponaibility to pre-
•ent to the jury the. plaintiff' a caae aa 
Well as possible. and if counael wants to 
call zeal in the presenting of tba case 
18 
''enthusiasm" or considerable enthuaia-" • 
then counsel for the plaintiff will have 
to plead guilty to this so called error. 
Mr. Berry as counsel for the defendant 
characterized as error the remark by 
counsel for the defendant in hia addreaa 
to the jury "not to conaide.r how the de-
fendant would pay any damages found by 
the jury," aa a atatement obvioualy made 
to remind the jurors that inauran.ce waa 
present. It ia .W:.itted that it ia not 
the province of the jury to consider the 
financial status of the defendant in a 
111atter of this kind, but to observe the 
ins tructiona of the Court, and they would 
certainly be violating their oaths aa of-
f ice rs of the Court if they attempted to 
assess daaagea due the plaintiff fraa 
the standpoint of defendant's ability to 
pay. 
Attention ia directed to the unfiniah-
19 
ed statement by counsel for plaintiff in 
his argument to the jury and which is re-
Mr. 
Berry (Appellant'• Brief page 29). It 
will be noted that the atateaent is not 
f ini•hed and whateftr intention counael 
for plaintiff might ha,,. bad in beginning 
th.a statement certaialy the part caaplai.nad 
of ia not prejudicial and would not haft 
been, had not Mr. Berry in hi• objection 
finiabad what he thou&ht waa tba intended 
statement of counsel in the following 
worda: 
"I object to this •• improper tne of 
argmient, asking the jury to couaider 
tbeaaelftll in the aituation of the 
wintiff. 'l'hia i• asking for QllP•thy 
paaalon and ia not proper." 
And tbe Court thereupon •tated: 
"I have already instructed the jury 
what counsel uya ia ru.terldence. It 
ia merely arg1Dent. A.a to it•a -l'l'O-
priety I • uncartain--" (Tr.78-79). 
No further r.ference ia aade to the 
objected matter, and no referance wbat-
•oeve.r is aade to the "Golden Rule" and 
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it ia therefore submitted that no error 
was committed by counsel in his rem.arks. 
But if it can be held that the un-
finished statement was in error and any 
inference that could have been drawn from. 
it by the jury was objectionabl,e, then the 
queation ariaea, did the aaae so inflame 
the juror's prejudice or paaaion to the 
extent that they awarded unreasonable 
damage a for tha injuries proved. In 
otharworda were the damages determined by 
th.e jury exceaaive, we sul:ait not. 
In Ara. Jur-53, 64 Cum. Supp., Sec. 496 
page 401 is a notation to add the follow-
ing to Note 9: 
"'nlere .are many cases in which it was 
recognized that counsel's argument ur-
ging the jurors to place themaelvea 
in the position of a litigant, or to 
allow auch recoV'8ry as they would wish 
if in the same position, waa improper, 
but that the oppoaing party waa not en-
titled to relief on the ground of pre• 
judice, in view of the c irc18atancea 
present." 
21 
Several cases are also referred to in 
70 ALR 2d, 937-945. In 70 ALR 2d, pag• 
945 Sec. 4 we find a Calilomia case refer-
red to, De Young va. Haywood reported in 
292 P. 2d 917 in wtich the Court aaidi 
"An action to recove.r for iajuri.aa 
sustained in an autcaobile accident, 
the Court, aff iming a judgaent for 
the plainti£f notwithstanding a state-
ment in his attomey'a ar"981lt that 
none of the jurors would be willing to 
go through such an accident for 
$9,000.00, said th t counsel for the 
plaintiff in their brief very properly 
did not try to justify the criticized 
atatemant, but aerely contended that 
it was not made with any improper 
motive and waa not prejudicial; and 
that certainly there waa notauch aia-
conduct as would warrant a reveraal of 
tna judpent •. 
Quoting further fraa 70 ALR. 2d, page 
954, Nota a--Verdict not esceaaiR·---
VERDICT NOT EXCESSIVE 
n'lbat the verdict of the jury waa not 
exceaaiva in amount baa been a factor 
in a few caaea in reaching a deter-
mination that although counsel'• argu-
ments urging the jurors to place t~­
aal ves in the position of the litigant 
or to allow such reeo'l8ry aa they would 
22 
wish if in the same position may have 
been improper no prejudice resulted." 
Then there are &any cases listed to 
sustain that position. Under the sae 
reference liile find the following: 
"A remark by counsel for the plain-
tiff to the jury, 'Wh.at would you have 
your wife treated for?' was improper, 
but was not of sufficient illlportanca 
to justify a reversal of the judpent 
for the plaintiff where the amount of 
the verdict did not ind~ "".'ite that it 
seriously affected the reaul t." 
Crosswhite vs. Barnes, Va. 124 
SE 242, 40 ALR 54. 
It is submitted that if the unfin-
ished argument of plaintiff 'a counael re-
ferred to could be interpreted as being 
improper and prejudicial the circua• 
stances of the case such aa the. statement 
of the Court that the jury had already 
been instructed that what counsel say• is 
not evidence merely argument; that the 
amount of damages awarded by the jury were 
certainly justified in view of the injuri&a 
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sustained by the plaintiff aa shown by 
plaintiff and Dr. Rutach. The amount of 
damage and the fact that it was in eYen 
numbers, to-wit, $10,000.00, does not ahow 
that the jurors were acting under prejudice 
or passion or that they were motivated by 
anything other than a desire to ccapen.-
sa te plaintiff in part for injuries sus-
tained, tbe pain and suffering enclure.d, and 
the assurance that part of said injuries at 
least would be permanent. 
CONCLUSION 
It is autmitted that no errors occurad 
in the trial of the case complained of by 
Appellant and that a new trial should be 
denied and that said judgment should be 
sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PICKETT & PICKETr 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Reapondent 
Pickett Building 
St. George, Utah 
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I hereby certify that on thia day 
of May, 1965, I mailed two copies of thia 
BRIEF by united States Mail, postage pre-
paid, to Raymond M. Berry, Attom.ey at Lav, 
Attorney for De.fendanta-.Appellants, 1473 
South llth East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
